

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 DAR ES 01326 01 OF 02 282125Z  
ACTION AF-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SSO-00 NSCE-00 SP-02 IO-13  
H-01 INR-10 INRE-00 EUR-12 DODE-00 CIAE-00 /064 W  
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O 281937Z MAR 78  
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8108

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 1326

E.O.11652: XGDS-2  
TAGS: PDEV US TZ  
SUBJECT: NYERERE LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT  
NYERERE TO PRESIDENT CARTER DELIVERED TO ME FOR TRANSMITTAL  
NIGHT OF MARCH 28:

2. BEGIN TEXT 28TH MARCH 1978

PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER,  
THE WHITE HOUSE,  
WASHINGTON D.C.  
U.S.A.

DEAR PRESIDENT CARTER,

AMBASSADOR SPAIN BROUGHT YOUR LETTER TO ME WHEN I SAW  
HIM WITH ANDREW YOUNG AND THE ACTING BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER  
WHILE THE DAR ES SALAAM'SUMMIT' MEETING WAS GOING ON. I  
ALSO TALKED WITH AMBASSADOR SPAIN AND MR. YOUNG AFTER THE  
END OF OUR CONFERENCE. BUT ALTHOUGH YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED  
FULL REPORTS FROM AMBASSADOR SPAIN AND ADREW YOUNG, I  
THOUGHT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF I SET OUT THE POSITION AS  
I NOW SEE IT.

DURING OUR MEETING, PRESIDENT KAUNDA, PRESIDENT MACHEL,  
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SECRET

PAGE 02 DAR ES 01326 01 OF 02 282125Z

PRESIDENT SERETSE KHAMA, AND MYSELF, WENT OVER ALL THE  
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS VERY  
CAREFULLY WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS, CONSIDERING THEM  
TOGETHER WITH THE CLARIFICATIONS BROUGHT OUT AT MALTA AND  
WLSEWHERE. WE DISCUSSED VERY FULLY ALSO THE DIFFERENT  
PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES WHICH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS  
HAD BEEN EXPRESSING AT A VARIETY OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

MEETINGS.

I THINK I CAN SAY THAT WE ACHIEVED SUCCESS IN OVERCOMING ALL THE MAJOR RESERVATIONS OR OBJECTIONS WHICH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSING AT MALTA AND ELSEWHERE TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE REMAINING PROBLEMS ARE MINOR ONES AND COULD BE QUICKLY CLEARED UP IF A FOLLOW-UP TO THE MALTA MEETING WAS HELD PRIOR TO THE CONFERENCE OF ALL THE RHODESIAN PARTIES. FOR AT SUCH A MALTA-FOLLOW-UP MEETING, THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS WOULD BE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE BRITISH ON THE ESSENTIAL POWERS OF THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER AS NOW OUTLINED, AND THE PRESENCE AND FUNCTIONS OF A UNITED NATIONS FORCE AS ENVISAGED IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS. THE REMAINING NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE ON A FEW DETAILS WHERE THEY STILL NEED REASSURANCE. THEY HAVE NOW, I THINK YOU WILL FIND, FULLY ACCEPTED THAT THEY CANNOT EXPECT SUCH A DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AS WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS. THEIR SPECIAL POSITION IN RELATION TO THE CEASE FIRE AND RELATED MILITARY MATTERS - WHICH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND YOURSELVES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED - DOES NOT ALTER THAT.

I DO REALISE THAT YOU WERE THINKING OF HOLDING A FULL CONFERENCE WITHOUT ANY FURTHER DELAY - INDEED THAT HAD AT FIRST BEEN MY IDEA ALSO, AND CERTAINLY I SHARE YOUR CONCERN TO GET ON WITH THE FULL CONFERENCE AS A MATTER OF URGENCY. BUT THERE ARE TWO MAIN REASONS - AND A THIRD WHICH COULD  
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 DAR ES 01326 01 OF 02 282125Z

BECOME SIGNIFICANT - WHY I BELIEVE IT TO BE IMPORTANT TO HAVE A MALTA-FOLLOW-UP MEETING FIRST. THIS COULD BE DONE QUITE QUICKLY AND REALLY IN THE INTERIM WHILE THE CONFERENCE ITSELF IS BEING ORGANIZED.

THE FIRST OF THESE REASONS IS THAT IT WAS THE DECLARED INTENTION AT MALTA TO HAVE SUCH A FURTHER MEETING; HOLDING IT SHOULD THEREFORE NOT OCCASION SURPRISE TO ANYONE. THE COMPLETION OF THIS PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS IS MADE MORE IMPORTANT BY THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN INTERNAL 'SETTLEMENT'. FOR THIS REQUIRES US ALL TO DEMONSTRATE IN ACTION THAT WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS AND THAT AGREEMENT WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE BASIS OF THEM. WE WILL THEN NOT ONLY HAVE THE SHAM 'AGREEMENT'; THERE WILL ALSO BE SUBSTANTIVE AGREEMENT ON INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNISED PROPOSALS BY THE MOST CRUCIAL OF THE NATIONALIST GROUPS.

THE SECOND REASON IS ALLIED TO THE FIRST. IF FORMAL INVITATIONS TO A FULL CONFERENCE WERE ISSUED IMMEDIATELY, THE 'INTERNAL PARTIES' MAY NOT RESPOND BECAUSE, BY JOINING SMITH, THEY HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY JOIN WITH HIM IN BASIC OPPOSITION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS. WE SHOULD THEN LOSE AN OPPORTUNITY PUBLICLY TO COMMIT THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS

TO THE PROPOSALS. THAT COMMITMENT I BELIEVE THEY ARE NOW  
READY TO MAKE AFTER SOME FURTHER REASSURANCE OF BRITISH AND  
AMERICAN COMMITMENT (WHICH A FOLLOW-UP MEETING WOULD ITSELF  
HELP TO PROVIDE) AND SOME ADJUSTMENTS ON MINOR MATTERS.

THERE IS A THIRD REASON WHY I URGE A MALTA-FOLLOW-UP  
MEETING RATHER THAN, FOR EXAMPLE, JUST TRYING TO DEAL WITH

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PAGE 01 DAR ES 01326 02 OF 02 282156Z  
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 8109

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 1326

THESE MATTERS BY PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS. IT IS THAT ONLY AT  
SUCH A FORMAL MEETING WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE FRONT  
LINE STATES TO PLAY A HELPFUL ROLE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IF  
THAT SHOULD AT ANY TIME DURING THE DISCUSSIONS BECOME NECESSARY.

I HAVE THEREFORE URGED PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN TO  
CALL THIS 'PRE-CONFERENCE' MEETING WITH THE PATRIOTIC FRONT.  
I HAVE TOLD HIM THAT HIS UNDERSTANDABLE FEARS THAT SUCH A  
MEETING WOULD STILL ARGUE ABOUT THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE  
PROPOSALS NEED NO LONGER BE AN IMPEDIMENT. THE PATRIOTIC  
FRONT LEADERS WILL ATTEND SUCH A FOLLOW-UP MEETING, AND,  
I REPEAT, SHOULD BE ABLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT QUICKLY ON  
WHAT THE BRITISH HAVE SO FAR BEEN SAYING ARE THE ESSENTIALS  
OF THE PROPOSALS.

NOR, FOLLOWING ON SUCH A MEETING, DO I ANTICIPATE  
ANY DIFFICULTY ABOUT GETTING THE PATRIOTIC FRONT LEADERS  
TO ATTEND A CONFERENCE CALLED BY BRITAIN TO WHICH ALL THE  
PARTIES CONCERNED HAVE BEEN INVITED. I CANNOT BE EQUALLY  
SURE THAT THE 'INTERNAL PARTIES' WILL ATTEND. BUT MY OPINION  
IS THAT THEY ARE LIKELY TO RESPOND POSITIVELY ONCE OUR  
ACTIONS HAVE CONVINCED THEM THAT WE ARE ALL FULLY COMMITTED  
TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS AND DETERMINED TO PROCEED  
ON THE BASIS OF THEM. FOR THESE SALISBURY PEOPLE NEED, AND  
KNOW THAT THEY NEED, A CEASE FIRE AND AN END TO SANCTIONS.  
ONCE IT IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE ONLY WAY TO GET THESE  
PRESSURES LIFTED IS TO REACH AGREEMENT AT A CONFERENCE ON THE

BASIS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS, THEN IT IS QUITE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 DAR ES 01326 02 OF 02 282156Z

POSSIBLE - INDEED I BELIEVE EVEN PROBABLE - THAT THEY WILL ATTEND. BUT IF THEY HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WILL BE A REDUCTION OF THE PRESSURES AGAINST THEM WITHOUT THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS, THEN THEY WILL REFUSE AN INVITATION TO SUCH A CONFERENCE. THAT IS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY IT IS SO IMPORTANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE ARMED STRUGGLE WILL CONTINUE AND SANCTIONS WILL CONTINUE UNLESS THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PROPOSALS ARE ACCEPTED.

AS I SEE IT, THE MALTA-FOLLOW-UP MEETING WILL CONCENTRATE ON FINISHING THE POLITICAL MATTERS OUTSTANDING BETWEEN THE PATRIOTIC FRONT AND THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS, WHICH ARE MAINLY ABOUT THE POWERS OF THE RESIDENT COMMISSIONER AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. AT THE MAIN CONFERENCE THERE CAN BE PARALLEL POLITICAL AND MILITARY DISCUSSIONS, WITH EVERYONE TAKING PART IN THE FORMER AND JUST THOSE CONCERNED PARTICIPATING IN THE LATTER.

CERTAINLY ONCE WE REACH THE POINT OF THE MAIN CONFERENCE NO-ONE CAN GUARANTEE SUCCESS. BUT AN ATTEMPT TO HOLD ONE SEEMS TO BE THE ONLY CHANCE THERE IS OF AVOIDING A WAR TO THE END. AND I BELIEVE THAT, PROVIDED WE MAINTAIN ALL THE PRESSURES ON THE ILLEGAL REGIME UNTIL THERE HAS BEEN A REAL TRANSFER OF POWER TO THE MAJORITY, WE DO STAND A REASONABLE CHANCE OF ACHIEVING THAT OBJECTIVE. TO DO THAT, HOWEVER, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT BEFORE AND DURING SUCH A CONFERENCE NONE OF US SHOULD APPEAR SO 'REASONABLE' THAT WE GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF FORGETTING THAT OUR OBJECTIVE IS THE OVERTHROW OF MINORITY RULE\* THE SLIGHTEST WEAKNESS, OR EVEN APPEARANCE OF PERSONAL SYMPATHY FOR HIM AS A POLITICIAN, WILL BE EXPLOITED BY SMITH FOR THE PURPOSE OF RETAINING MINORITY RULE OR MINORITY PRIVILEGE.

MR. PRESIDENT: I DO APPRECIATE THE TIME AND ATTENTION WHICH YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES ARE GIVING TO THIS RHODESIA QUESTION. I BELIEVE THAT IT IS AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 DAR ES 01326 02 OF 02 282156Z

OVERTHROW OF MINORITY RULE, AND AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THIS NEGOTIATION PROCESS, WHICH GIVES US SOME HOPE - ON THIS ATTEMPT - OF AVOIDING THE NECESSITY TO CONTINUE THE LIBERATION WAR UNTIL THE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC COLLAPSE OF THE PRESENT REGIME.

I WOULD LIKE TO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SEND ONCE AGAIN AND PERSONAL GOOD WISHES FOR YOU AND MRS. CARTER.

YOURS SINCERELY,

JULIUS K. NYERERE

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## Message Attributes

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